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Abstract—We are witnessing a veritable explosion of interest in
new electronic payments systems and modalities, such as digital
wallets, mobile and contactless payments, and cryptocurrencies
such as Bitcoin. One area of research and commercial inter-
est at the confluence of these trends, which is also receiving
reinvigorated attention, is micropayments. Indeed, a workable
micropayments system, one that lets users purchase digital
content in an easy and “hassle-free” manner with payments in
the order of cents and lower, has long been regarded as the holy
grail of web-publishing. The research community has actively
worked on this problem over the past two decades, numerous
creative solutions have been presented, business ventures have
been launched, but a mainstream solution has yet to emerge.
In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive survey of key
trends and innovations in the development of research-based
and commercial micropayment systems. Based on our study, we
argue that past solutions have largely failed because research
has focused heavily on cryptographic and engineering innovation,
whereas fundamental issues pertaining to usability, psychology,
and economics have been neglected. We contextualize the range of
existing challenges for micropayments systems, discuss potential
deployment strategies, and identify critical stumbling blocks,
some of which we believe researchers and developers have yet to
fully recognize. We hope this effort will motivate and guide the
development of micropayments systems.
Index Terms—micropayments, cryptocurrencies, electronic
payments systems
I. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing popularity of Bitcoin has inspired keen interest
in digital currencies in the research community, the financial
sector, and even at the government level. This surge has also
rekindled the conversation on developing systems to enable
micropayments, i.e. low-value digital transactions, typically in
the order of pennies and cents. Micropayment transactions may
be considered the electronic equivalent of purchases made us-
ing pocket cash or spare change. Historically, the problem with
low-value transactions has been that processing and transaction
fees end up dwarfing the actual transaction amount1. Payment
processors impose these fees for a variety of reasons including
infrastructure costs, administrative charges, and mechanisms
for fraud prevention and dispute resolution. There has been
considerable research in the past two decades on using digital
communications and cryptography to minimize these costs,
ideally down to the fraction-of-a-cent range.
The traditional argument goes that, if enabled, micropay-
ments stand to be a key pillar of the information economy [2],
1For instance, in 2014 UK-issued debit and credit cards (with chip and pin)
typically averaged transaction fees of 14 and 81.5 pence respectively [1].
with direct and immediate applications in reviving journalism
[3] and supporting the music industry [4]. The ability to
economically transfer minuscule amounts of money at high
speeds will empower dynamic new pricing models where dig-
ital content such as online newspapers, magazines, and music
albums can be unbundled, allowing consumers to purchase
individual news stories, articles, and songs. Furthermore, with
pricing in the sub-dollar range, users will be encouraged
to increase spending and also engage in impulse purchases,
thereby opening up powerful new revenue streams.
There have been two main waves of innovation in designing
and deploying micropayment systems, the first in the late
1990s and the second in the 2000s [5] [6]. Both efforts largely
failed, and only a few systems have survived. Reasons include
poor infrastructure support, cumbersome and non-intuitive
system design, and conservatism on the part of financial
institutions and users. Critics have also cited poor business
cases and neglect of critical psychological factors [7] [8] [9].
Today, however, the landscape has changed in some fun-
damental ways. First and foremost, the business case for
micropayments is validated. Large numbers of consumers now
regularly make low-value payments for online content. Apple’s
iTunes store has proved a resounding success [10]. In the
smartphone universe, iOS app developers reportedly made over
$10 billion in 2014 from in-app purchases, to put in context,
a figure greater than Hollywood’s box office earnings [11].
New multiplayer video games now enable millions of players
to make in-game purchases as part of gameplay. The popular
League of Legends singlehandedly earned $624 million in
2013, and almost a billion dollars in 2014 [12], from these
‘microtransactions’ in which players purchase premium in-
game items like characters, weapons, healing portions, etc.
costing single digit dollar amounts.
Second, the current advertising-based web publishing model
is in crisis. Web ads are intrusive, degrade user experience,
and significantly increase data consumption [13], a particular
concern for mobile users [14]. Users are also concerned about
privacy and third party tracking [15] [16] [17], especially in
the wake of the Snowden revelations [18].
Collectively these factors have given rise to the ‘ad-wars’
phenomenon: globally, some 198 million people deploy ad-
blocking software, such as Ghostery and Adblock Plus, leading
to a staggering $22 billion in lost revenues [19]. Upcoming
versions of Apples IoS9 and OSX 10.11 are both reported to
feature default ad blocking functionality [20]. A recent study
[19] notes that adblockers pose an “existential threat” to the
ad-based publishing model. Some commentators are therefore
calling for a fundamental rethink of the current web publishing
model [21] [22]. Micropayments are a leading alternative.
Third, there are promising developments on the ground.
The technology has vastly improved in the last decade: high
speed broadband is ubiquitous, public key infrastructure is
widely deployed, Web browsers have far more functionality,
and smartphone penetration is high. Public attitudes have
also changed: millions regularly engage in online banking
and participate on social networks. The concept of mobile
wallets and cryptocurrencies is no longer alien. Surveys report
people are now more willing to pay for online content [23]
[24]. Charities have begun to leverage micropayments (or
‘microdonations’) for raising funds [25].
There is also the Bitcoin experiment. Whereas Bitcoin’s
long term success is still an open question, its popularity
has nonetheless inspired researchers to reimagine payments
systems. Financial institutions and governments also appear
more receptive to innovation. Some of the world’s largest
banks are already in the process of appropriating Bitcoin’s
key innovation, the blockchain, to reduce infrastructure costs
by an estimated $15-20 billion [26].
Due to these factors we are witnessing what we believe
is the third wave of micropayment systems. Several new
micropayments solutions have launched, several more are
about to, and collectively several millions of dollars of startup
capital has been raised. Blendle, an “iTunes for newspapers”,
has received substantial press, and has made deals with the
New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street
Journal to sell individual articles for 20 cents on average [27].
WeChat, a leading Chinese content publishing platform, and
one of the world’s largest, with 600 million active users intends
to introduce a ‘like’ button which will allow readers to reward
authors with micropayment donations ranging from under $1
up to $30 [28]. Google Contributor allows users to pay a small
monthly fee for an ad-free browsing experience on supported
websites [29]. And a slew of solutions, such as Bitwall,
BitMonet and Flattr, piggyback on Bitcoin’s payment network
[30] taking advantage of Bitcoin’s low transaction fees2. Brave
Software Inc. is currently trialling a micropayments solution
integrated directly into the Brave Web browser [32].
We believe therefore that this is an opportune time to revisit
the topic of micropayments. Our contributions are:
1) We undertake a comprehensive survey of micropayments
solutions in the research literature and highlight the
workings and key features of representative systems,
2) We classify past and present commercial micropayments
systems and identify the strategies they use,
3) We identify key challenges ahead in design and deploy-
ment of these systems and formulate recommendations.
Based on our study, we find is that there is considerable
room for work. Research-based systems consist almost entirely
2At the time of writing, the minimum transaction fees for Bitcoin Core
version 0.11.1 stands at 0.00005 satoshis which equates to $0.02 [31].
of novel cryptographic solutions with the primary design focus
being security and efficiency concerns, whereas commercial
systems opt for simple and intuitive cost-cutting strategies such
as aggregating multiple payments and automating payment
processing. These two domains are mostly isolated from each
other (with the notable exception of Bitcoin-based micropay-
ments systems). However, the vast majority of micropayments
solutions have failed, in large part due to neglect of critical
non-technical concerns such as usability issues, ethical and le-
gal concerns, poor business cases, and ineffective deployment
strategies. However, we believe that once these challenges
are fully recognized, technology may be successfully used to
address them. For this reason, we do not restrict our study
solely to the cryptographic literature, but also draw together
critical insights from other domains impacting micropayments
systems.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to perform
such a broad study. We have located only two prior surveys
on micropayment systems in the past decade: Pa´rhonyi [6]
documents micropayments systems with a focus on commer-
cial solutions, whereas Jain et al. [33] specifically consider
peer-to-peer schemes from the research literature. Surveys
on digital currencies (e.g. [34] [35]) usually include some
micropayments schemes but the emphasis is on aspects of
electronic cash in general. Micropayments systems involve
certain unique challenges (technological, psychological, and
economic) differentiating them from general payments systems
and necessitate a specialized study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II,
we introduce key properties of micropayments systems and
broadly summarize developments in this field. In Sec. III-
IV, we examine the range of cryptographic and commercial
solutions and emphasize their strengths and weaknesses. In
Sec. V, we discuss key challenges ahead and present recom-
mendations. We conclude in Sec. VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we qualify micropayments, discuss proper-
ties of micropayments systems and trace their development.
A. Definitions and Properties
There is considerable variance over how small a payment
must be to qualify as a micropayment. One of the earliest
solutions, Millicent, envisioned transactions in the sub-penny
range [36]. Kniberg classifies them as payments of up to BC1
[37], whereas a study of European online payments sets the
threshold at BC5 [38]. Commercial provider PayPal classes
micropayments as typically under $10 [39]. There is, however,
broad agreement that the associated processing fees should be
low enough to justify very small transactions and that these
costs should ideally be significantly less than those charged
by mainstream payment systems, such as credit cards.
The size of the payments broadly determine the require-
ments of the payment system. For macropayments (i.e. large
and medium-sized payments), regulation may mandate that
payments be recorded and that dispute-resolution mechanisms
be implemented. Customers themselves may prefer extensive
transaction records and fraud prevention mechanisms for large
value payments, all of which result in higher processing costs.
Furthermore, users typically make large transactions much
less frequently than smaller ones and processing fees for the
former may not seem too heavy a burden. User anonymity
and processing fees are therefore generally of secondary
importance in macropayments and assume primary concern
as payment size approaches the sub-dollar range.
Processing fees for payments systems generally comprise
infrastructure and clearing costs, i.e. costs due to equipment,
computation, storage, communication and accounting. Certain
systems may incur additional costs, depending on transaction
type or payment modality. However, micropayments also in-
volve what economists describe as cognitive or mental trans-
action costs, i.e. the “hassle-factor” associated with having to
choose fine-grained bundling options at very low prices. Szabo
[7] has argued persuasively that researchers often overlook the
fact that these mental costs outweigh the technological and are
a determining factor in system adoption.
In the context of e-commerce, micropayment systems are
generally envisioned as incurring minimal processing delay
and facilitating instant delivery of goods [40]. The micropay-
ments ecosystem typically consists of three principal entities:
customer or user denotes an individual or party which trans-
acts goods and services from a merchant. The transaction is
enabled or facilitated by a broker. This role often belongs
to banks or financial institutions which issue the financial in-
strument or currency used in the transaction, maintain balance
accounts for customers and merchants, redeem their funds,
and arbitrate in dispute resolution3. Some systems may involve
other entities such as peers, certificate authorities, or trusted
third parties for various purposes.
System design and uptake is determined by which properties
the system provides. We discuss here key properties pertaining
to micropayments systems:
Anonymity: refers to the exposure of the customer’s iden-
tity and personal information to the merchant and the broker
as a direct result of using the payment system. Anonymity
in this sense is synonymous with customer privacy. Complete
anonymity is achievable with physical cash, whereas with a
credit card, both merchant and bank are privy to the customer’s
identity and her purchase details. Some commercial systems
offer strong anonymity. An example is paysafecard where
customers acquire prepaid scratchcards from shops for later
spending without revealing any personal information.
Considerable legal issues come into play as a truly anony-
mous payment mechanism can become a tool for money
laundering and crime. Some systems achieve partial anonymity
by using pseudonyms to shield personal information from
merchants but not the banks. Indeed, in the majority of com-
mercial systems we survey, anonymity from the bank is not
a design goal. Another notion is that of revocable anonymity
where customer privacy may be overturned in the event of
3We use the terms broker and bank interchangeably in this paper.
disputes [41]. Anonymity is ensured either through employing
cryptography or defining special procedures. Anonymity is
typically established when the customer acquires the currency
from the broker or when she pays the merchant.
Security: refers to the integrity of the system, its resilience
to fraud, and in particular its ability to prevent counterfeiting
and double-spending. In most commercial systems such as
PayPal, the broker maintains a customer balance and explicitly
authorizes every transaction. Bitcoin extends this approach by
employing a distributed and highly synchronized ledger called
the blockchain. A novel strategy, used by MicroMint, is to use
cryptography to mint crypto-tokens which are far too difficult
and expensive to counterfeit.
Validation: indicates whether a system requires real-time
contact with the broker to process transactions. Payments
systems in the 1990s were limited by low-speed and unreliable
dial-up Internet access. Furthermore, requiring the broker in
every transaction effectively rendered him a communications
bottleneck and a single point of failure in the system. Some
solutions, referred to as ‘optimistic’ [42], resolved this issue
by contacting the broker only for a small subset of transac-
tions, generally those that proved exceptional or problematic.
However, this restriction is now considerably relaxed due to
ubiquitous high-speed broadband access and the prevalence of
cloud computing.
Transferability: denotes the ease and extent of transferring
funds using the system. This includes notions of system cov-
erage, acceptability, and penetration among customers and
merchants. Some systems permit a wider range of transactions,
such as peer-to-peer transactions in which users may transfer
funds directly to each other. Transferability also includes
interoperability, i.e. permitting payments between different
systems and financial institutions, and versatility, i.e. facil-
itating different payment options, such as offline payments,
payments using handheld devices, etc.
Payment Mode: indicates how a system actually undertakes
the transfer of value between parties. Pre-paid (or debit-based)
systems require the customer to input funds into the system
prior to making payments which are later deducted from her
account. Post-paid (or credit-based systems) track customer
spending and charge her at the end of the billing period.
Certain properties apply only to select systems. For exam-
ple, divisibility, i.e. the ability of the system to make payments
of arbitrary value, is a limiting factor for some token-based
systems. Some systems assume specific relationship models,
i.e. the service or user experience may be different depending
on whether the customer and merchant have a long-term or
persistent business relationship as opposed to casual or tran-
sient interactions. Some systems may be hardware-reliant,
i.e. the payment solution relies on a physical device or card
which stores cryptographic credentials or currency units. This
category includes mobile wallets, smartcards such as Octopus,
and Bitcoin wallets like Trezor [43] and Case [44].
In conclusion, there are certain properties common to
electronic and networked systems in general. These include
usability, the ease of use of a system, scalability, the ability of
a system to handle increasing numbers of users and larger pay-
ment volumes without significantly degrading performance,
and reliability, the measure of how dependable a system is.
Next we briefly summarize developments in this field.
B. A Short History of Micropayment Systems
The motivation for micropayments derives primarily from
the notion of the information economy [2]. Digital goods
such as music mp3 files, blogposts, and software are distinct
from their physical counterparts, CDs, newspapers, etc. in
fundamental ways. For one, digital goods typically bear high
fixed costs but negligible marginal costs, i.e. they are expensive
to produce but the cost of reproducing these goods is near
zero. Deriving from this notion, digital goods are also non-
rival goods, i.e. they are not restricted to a single customer
and may be consumed by multiple parties simultaneously.
These characteristics also apply to digital services which
include not just traditional services such as stock quotes and
newspapers delivered in electronic format but also interactive
new paradigms such as massive multi-player online games
(MMOGs). Furthermore, the Internet enables mass distribution
of digital goods and services at low-cost: not only do cus-
tomers have greater access to goods and services but electronic
transaction costs are also significantly smaller. In this scenario,
affixing very low fees to digital goods and services can prove
a powerful source of long-term revenue for merchants.
Micropayment systems for digital content were envisioned
as early as the 1960s, when visionary Ted Nelson conceived
of intrinsically bidirectional hyperlinks, enabling users to
electronically pay for content that they access [45]. In the
late 1990s, pioneers Tim Berners-Lee and Marc Andreessen
considered incorporating micropayments directly into the Web
at the protocol level but were discouraged by conservative
banking regulations [46].
Observers broadly agree that there have been two waves of
innovation in micropayment systems [5] [6].
The first generation of systems surfaced in the mid-1990s,
inspired by the electronic cash movement led by DigiCash.
In keeping with the dial-up Internet infrastructure of the
time and the relatively low processing power on computers,
the main design goal for these systems was to minimize
communication and computation costs. A popular strategy
used by by these systems was the account-based approach,
used by systems such as CyberCoin, Mini-Pay and NetBill.
In this case, the broker maintained accounting ledgers for
customers and merchants and aggregated net flow of funds
in and out of the system. A centralized ledger prevents
double-spending and fraud, whereas aggregation of multiple
low-value payments effectively amortizes the processing fees
incurred in moving funds between the system and the banking
infrastructure. A second strategy, the crypto-token approach,
employed by systems such as PayWord and MicroMint, used
cryptographic mechanisms to mint digital tokens which were
computationally infeasible to counterfeit. Customers then used
these tokens to transact with merchants.
Several of these solutions were commercialized in partner-
ship with well-known brands, such as DEC, IBM, and Visa
but efforts were to fail for a variety reasons. The dial-up
infrastructure was slow and unreliable. These systems had
poor usability and suffered from high latency. CyberCash, for
example, typically took 15-20 seconds to finalize a transaction
[47]. Systems such as Mondex and CAFE also required trusted
hardware. Furthermore, the business models have been heavily
criticized [8] [9], the systems had poor interoperability, and
consequently there was low penetration among merchants.
The second generation of micropayment systems, appearing
around 2000, were mostly account-based offerings, such as
PayPal and ClickandBuy. Users transferred funds into the
system and then used the amount to make payments. This
approach had a physical counterpart in prepaid cards, such as
Wallie and paysafecard, which users purchased at shops for
fixed denominations and then progressively ‘spent’ in online
transactions. Another innovation was the use of communi-
cations infrastructure, such as email and mobile phones, to
validate transactions, as done in systems like Zong.
Several of these systems have survived to the present day.
Reasons include good usability, intuitive design, and low
latency. For instance, ClickandBuy puts specific icons on
merchant websites, which users click to access the payment
portal, following which they get immediate access to pur-
chased content. Legislation has evolved to protect users from
fraud and safeguard their privacy.
However, the biggest difference is the cultural shift and
change in user attitudes due to the advent of online banking
and popular online marketplaces such as Amazon. Brand
association also played a critical role in the success of pay-
ments systems, as evidenced in the example of Apple’s iTunes
platform and PayPal’s partnership with eBay [48].
Over the last two decades, there have been efforts to
standardize micropayment protocols by organizations such as
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the PayCircle con-
sortium, and the Secure Mobile Payment Services (SEMOPS)
project. These projects made valuable contributions, including
designs for payment protocols, APIs for payment-enabled
applications, and mobile payments solutions, but none of these
proposals have thus far been ratified into full standards. These
efforts are described in more detail in Appendix. B.
III. CRYPTOGRAPHY-BASED SYSTEMS
Here we present a representative selection of micropayments
systems relying on cryptographic mechanisms.
We divide these systems into six categories: in centralized
systems, brokers mediate customer-merchant interactions and
may even authorize purchases in real-time. In voucher-based
systems, customers buy vouchers from brokers which they
use to make purchases directly from merchants. Commitment-
based systems enable customers to pay using signed commit-
ments, much like paying by cheque. In crypto-token solutions
transactions are done using tokens that are computationally
infeasible to counterfeit. Some systems rely on probabilistic
redemption, i.e. instead of processing multiple small transac-
tions, they probabilistically choose one and inflate the transac-
tion amount accordingly. Peer-to-peer systems adapt several of
these solutions for peer-to-peer networks. Bitcoin has emerged
as the most popular example of this type. We also discuss
proposals to facilitate micropayments using Bitcoin.
A. Centralized Solutions
Chrg-http [49] invented by Tang and Low in 1996 is
not a payment protocol per se, but essentially adapts the
Kerberos authentication system to set up a secure channel
between customer and merchant. Our customer, Alice, contacts
a centralized broker who verifies her identity and issues her
credentials to communicate with a merchant. Alice makes
purchases and the merchant maintains a running balance and
bills her at periodic intervals, thereby amortizing transaction
costs. Chrg-http was implemented on the Mosaic web browser.
NetBill [50], developed at Carnegie Mellon University in
1995 in partnership with Visa, is a debit-based system for
purchasing digital content.
The process flow is as follows: a NetBill server maintains
accounts for customers and merchants. Prior to shopping,
Alice charges her account by transferring funds into it. The
server issues her credentials consisting of a unique user ID and
a public/private key pair. An adaptation of Kerberos is used to
authenticate communication between customer and merchant.
To purchase a digital item Alice clicks a button on the
website, thereby contacting the merchant with her ID and a
request for a price quote. The merchant verifies the ID and
responds with a price offer. If Alice approves, she sends an
acceptance message, resulting in provisional delivery, i.e. the
merchant encrypts the item and sends it to Alice. Delivery of
the decryption key, however, is conditional upon payment.
Alice next prepares and digitally signs an electronic pay-
ment order (EPO) which she sends to the merchant. The
merchant appends the decryption key to the EPO, signs the
whole package to endorse it, and forwards it to the NetBill
server. The server checks if the details are in order, and if
Alice’s account has sufficient credit, it authorizes the payment.
The payment amount is deducted from Alice’s account and
credited to the merchant, and the transaction is logged.
The server returns a signed copy of the receipt to the mer-
chant with decryption key attached. The merchant forwards a
copy to Alice who can now decrypt her purchased item.
The protocol may appear complicated but discourages fraud
and facilitates dispute resolution. The EPO includes times-
tamps, customer and merchant IDs, and identifiers and hash
fingerprints of the digital goods being purchased. Alice only
signs the EPO after she has received the goods, thereby
ensuring delivery. If the merchant reneges on his commitment
after the payment is cleared by withholding the decryption
key, Alice may contact the NetBill server directly for it.
NetBill has several advantages. No credit card numbers are
sent over the Internet. Alice may maintain multiple NetBill
accounts and use pseudonyms to protect her privacy. All
transactions are handled within the NetBill system and there
are no inter-institution clearing costs. Initial transactions from
outside the system to fund customer accounts are typically
high volume to amortize transaction costs. Merchant earnings
are similarly aggregated before they are transferred from his
NetBill account to his bank.
However, there are some shortcomings. Alice may be
anonymized to the merchant but NetBill is still privy to all her
transactions. A relatively large number of messages have to be
exchanged for a successful transaction. There is heavy usage
of digital signatures which are compute-intensive operations.
Proprietary NetBill software is required.
B. Voucher-based Solutions
In these systems, customers make purchases using digital
vouchers obtained from the broker. These systems are intuitive
and easy to understand. An advantage of this approach is that
the broker need not be involved in transactions. Examples of
such systems include Millicent and Foo.
Millicent [36] was invented by Mark Manasse at DEC in
1995, to facilitate sale of online content such as news articles
and stock quotes, etc. It is a debit-based system which aimed
to provide transaction fees in the sub-cent range.
Millicent vouchers are merchant-specific. Brokers purchase
vouchers in bulk from merchants and sell them to customers
in turn. Some brokers may obtain a license from the merchant
to produce the vouchers themselves as per demand. Customers
wishing to purchase items first contact the broker to purchase
vouchers for the particular merchant. Vouchers are managed
by wallet software on the customer’s machine. Customers
maintain accounts with brokers but not with merchants.
A Millicent voucher (referred to as scrip) comprises two
parts: the first consists of identifiers, such as scrip ID and
merchant ID. The body contains information pertaining to the
voucher, such as its value and expiration date. To certify the
voucher as genuine, the creator of the voucher concatenates the
body of the voucher together with a master secret credential
and uses a one-way collision-free hash function to generate an
authenticator which is then appended to the voucher.
To initiate a purchase, Alice sends a content request to the
merchant along with a voucher for payment. She certifies the
request by concatenating it with her voucher and a secret
credential she shares with the merchant, and using a hash
function to generate an authenticator which she affixes to the
request. The merchant checks if her request and voucher are
genuine and then compares the voucher against a database of
used vouchers to confirm that it has not been used before.
He then dispatches her purchased content. Leftover change is
issued in the form of a new voucher for the change amount.
Millicent’s advantages include the fact that it only uses
hash functions which are considerably more lightweight than
public key cryptography. The broker does not have be online
during transactions as the merchant does verification at his end.
Millicent also offers partial anonymity in that the merchant
need not know the identify of the customer. However the
broker maintains a record of all sold vouchers.
However, there are also disadvantages. For one, vouchers
are merchant-specific and the system is best suited for long-
term customer-merchant relationships.There are also potential
dispute resolution issues as only the creator of the voucher
can verify it as genuine, since he alone possesses the master
credential used to certify it. Non-repudiation is not possible
without public-key cryptography. Furthermore, there needs
to be a process enabling customer and merchant to share a
secret credential which the merchant later uses to verify the
customer’s purchase requests.
Millicent was briefly trialled in the United States in 1997.
An integration of the Millicent payment system with the
Minstrel Push system is described in [51].
A related scheme from Foo and Boyd [52] inverts Milli-
cent’s protocol for greater efficiency and easy implementation.
In their scheme, Alice visits the merchant’s website where
she can download pre-encrypted copies of the content she is
interested in purchasing along with payment vouchers. She
then pays for the vouchers at the bank at which point the
bank provides her with a decryption key for the goods. The
advantage of this scheme is that the burden for processing
transactions shifts completely onto the bank and minimal
upgrading is required at the merchant’s end.
Netcents [53] by Poutanen et al. overcomes merchant lock-
in by using floating scrips, i.e. signed vouchers which may
be passed from merchant to merchant, but valid only with
one at a time. Vouchers are customer-specific, issued to them
by banks, and contain a balance which customers can spend
progressively making purchases from different merchants.
To make a payment, Alice sends the merchant a certified
electronic payment order and a voucher. To pay a second
merchant using the remaining balance on her voucher, Alice
requests him to contact the first merchant directly. All three
parties then engage in a protocol to transfer ownership of the
voucher to the second merchant with an updated balance.
Netcents relies heavily on digital signatures and intensive
communication. Each voucher also bears a signed history of
its past which is visible to merchants. A proposed solution is
to use blinding mechanisms to hide this history.
The influence of voucher-based schemes is clearly evident
in peer-to-peer schemes such as PPay and Bitcoin (Sec. III-F)
where the basic currency units are vouchers which are arbi-
trarily divisible and float from owner to owner.
C. Commitment-based Systems
In these systems customers make purchases using signed
promissory notes from customer to merchant, which merchants
encash at the bank at regular intervals. The bank also is-
sues customers and merchants with credentials (ID and pub-
lic/private key pair) enabling them to engage in transactions.
Agora [54], a credit-based system invented by Gabber and
Silberschatz in 1996, is a representative example.
To initiate a purchase Alice requests a price quotation
from the merchant. The merchant responds with the quote,
which includes the price of the item, a unique transaction ID,
merchant ID certified by the bank, and the merchant’s public
key. Alice verifies that the merchant ID is current and the price
is correct. She prepares a purchase order, which includes her
certified customer ID and public key, the transaction ID, and
the agreed item price. She digitally signs this order before
sending it, thereby committing to the purchase of the item as
specified by the merchant.
The merchant verifies that Alice’s ID is authorized by the
bank and the signature on the purchase order is valid, and
then dispatches the item. At the end of the billing period,
the merchant submits the transaction messages to the bank
as proof of transaction. The bank debits the corresponding
amount from Alice’s account and credits it to the merchant.
Banks can facilitate partial anonymity by issuing customers
with aliases. The unique transaction ID protects against replay
attacks and double-charging, and the use of digital signatures
prevents both parties from altering messages later to claim
a different price, as well as protects communication over
insecure channels. The authors recommend embedding a hash
fingerprint of the purchased item in the exchanged messages
for dispute resolution purposes.
In the possibility that a customer (or a thief who has stolen
customer credentials) may make large transactions and not
pay later, banks can mandate a limit for customer purchases,
exceeding which the bank is required to explicitly authorize
future transactions. Banks can also alert merchants by period-
ically broadcasting lists of revoked credentials.
The Agora protocol is remarkably lightweight. The authors
develop a Java applet which piggybacks transaction messages
onto regular HTTP communications between client and server.
MiniPay [55] developed in 1997 by Herzberg and Yochai
innovates on the basic Agora protocol by incorporating Inter-
net service providers (ISPs) as brokers and clearing houses.
This idea has precedent in the example of premium telephone
numbers used to pay for phone services, such as voting for
TV shows and adult chat services.
Customers and merchants maintain accounts with their ISPs,
which also issue credentials and specify spending limits.
Merchants embed pricing information for items in HTML
links. Customers make purchases using software wallets which
generate signed commitments in a convenient ‘click-and-
pay’ manner. At the end of the billing period, the merchant
submits purchase proofs to his ISP which consolidates various
payments and settles outstanding accounts with other ISPs.
MiniPay was successfully trialled and set to launch as a
commercial solution by IBM, but this did not materialize.
D. Crypto-token Solutions
These systems use cryptography to mint unique non-
forgeable tokens to use in transactions. There are two main
approaches to generate tokens, both relying on hash functions.
1) Hash structures: These systems derive from Lamport’s
use of hash chains as one-time passwords [56], also the
foundation of Haller’s S/KEY protocol [57].
A representative system is PayWord [58] developed in 1997
by Rivest and Shamir. PayWord is a credit-based protocol.
In the PayWord ecosystem, the broker issues Alice a cer-
tificate validating her as an authentic customer. Alice then
mints ‘paywords’, which are payment tokens she will use
to pay the merchant. She picks a random seed value which
is then repeatedly hashed using a collision-resistant one-way
hash function (like SHA1) to generate a chain.
To initialize a purchase, Alice sends a digitally signed
commitment to the merchant with information regarding the
purchase, such as merchant ID, her customer certificate, and
the very last value, or ‘root’, of the hash chain. Computing a
signature over this root value essentially certifies the chain and
bootstraps the payment process. Each preceding hash value is
considered a valid payment token.
The merchant verifies the certificate and signature and
authorizes the sale. Alice then sends him successive tokens, an
amount corresponding to the price of her item. The merchant
hashes the first token he receives to check if it matches the
signed root in the commitment message. Each token is likewise
checked to verify that it hashes to the previously received
token. The one-way nature of the hash function ensures that the
merchant can only traverse the chain in the reverse direction,
i.e. he can verify tokens, but he cannot generate new ones
himself. And due to the one-way nature of the hash function,
it is computationally infeasible to forge tokens.
When payment is complete, the merchant sends Alice her
item. He sends the commitment message and the final received
token to the bank which verifies transaction details and the
integrity of the hash chain, and debits Alice’s account by the
corresponding amount, crediting it to the merchant.
Like Millicent, this scheme is fast and lightweight since
hash operations are orders of magnitude faster than digital sig-
nature operations and is ideally suited for long-term customer-
merchant relationships.
Receiving change is not straightforward and may require a
reverse PayWord transaction from merchant to customer. How-
ever, Alice may vary denomination of individual paywords in
consultation with the merchant and certify the decision by
scripting it in the purchase commitment. PayWord can also be
used in a debit-based scenario where brokers generate and sell
paywords to customers who then use them to shop.
Similar schemes using hash chains were developed indepen-
dently by multiple parties including Pederson [59], micro-iKP
[60], and notably the NetCard project [61] which attempted to
integrate this solution with existing banking infrastructure.
Researchers have also innovated further on PayWord. Kim et
al. [62] describe a mechanism enabling a customer to transact
with multiple merchants with a single hash chain operation.
PayTree [63] amortizes signature costs by integrating Pay-
Word chains with Merkle trees, so that one signature certifies
multiple chains at once. The tree structure also opens up
other interesting possibilities: different chains can be used to
transact with different merchants concurrently, and chains may
be efficiently initialized with various token denominations.
NetPay [64] adapts PayWord for decentralized scenarios. In
this case banks issue customers with wallets of payword tokens
which they use to purchase items. The first merchant verifies
tokens received from the customer by directly contacting the
bank. The next merchant however contacts the first merchant
to verify token he receives, and so on and so forth for other
merchants. The bank therefore does not need to be involved
every time the customer interacts with a new merchant.
2) Hash Collisions: These schemes exploit the inherent
difficulty of finding hash collisions, i.e. two input values
which map to the same 160-bit hash output value. As per the
‘birthday attack’ finding a single hash collision requires, on
average, hashing through 1.2×2160/2 values, which entails not
just immense computation effort and time, but also enormous
storage requirements (all input/output values have to be stored
and searched to identify a collision).
Verifying a collision, however, is extremely easy: one just
has to hash the input strings and confirm if the outputs match.
This sharp asymmetry in generating and verifying collisions
can be exploited by using partial hash collisions as tokens.
This is the approach taken by MicroMint [58], invented by
Rivest and Shamir in 1997, a debit-based system which uses
k-way hash collisions as payment tokens.
A k-way collision is a set of k distinct input strings which
yield the same partial hash output, i.e. the outputs agree for
a specific number of bits. Different combinations of these
input strings are packaged into tokens which customers use for
transactions. Merchants check the authenticity of tokens when
accepting them by verifying the collisions, and later redeem
them with the broker. It is impractical to counterfeit these
tokens but they can easily be duplicated. To prevent double-
spending, brokers only redeem spent tokens once.
We describe here the intuition of how collisions are gener-
ated: the broker sets up a number of storage bins to classify
input strings based on their hash output, such that strings
which create partial hash collisions will end up in the same bin.
The authors anticipate that tokens are minted over a month-
long period using special-purpose hardware optimized for hash
computations, and it is highly likely that many bins will end
up with multiple strings. The broker then packages strings in
separate bins into individual tokens.
This system calls for substantial initial investment on the
part of the broker. Researchers have since proposed optimiza-
tions for the minting process [65] [66] [67] and discussed
implementation concerns [68] [69]. Some prototype imple-
mentations have also been described [70] [71].
MicroMint has not inspired many derivative schemes, but
the notion of using hash function collisions has proved in-
fluential in other domains and inspired the notion of proof-
of-work schemes [72] [67] which force a party to undertake
computational effort in return for some privilege. Hashcash
[73], a prominent example, was originally proposed to limit
spam email and denial-of-service attacks and has since been
adopted by Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.
E. Probabilistic Audit and Redemption Mechanisms
These systems reduce processing costs by probabilistically
selecting and processing individual micropayments from a
set of many such that the odds of identifying fraud or fair
compensation are maximized.
1) Probabilistic Auditing: Jarecki and Odlyzko [74] at-
tempt to bridge the gap between solutions relying on real-
time availability of the broker, like NetBill, and those which
necessitate only periodic access at the end of the billing period,
examples like PayWord and MicroMint. The goal is to reduce
communication overhead while still detecting if the customer
tries to cheat or exceed her credit limits.
The solution is for merchants to accept customer payments
and use a probabilistic mechanism to determine whether
or not to forward the transaction to the bank in real-time.
The frequency with which payments are sent to the bank
are calculated as a function of the monetary values of the
transactions and the amount of risk the bank is willing to take.
As transactions grow larger, therefore, the merchant contacts
the bank more frequently, whereas, for low value amounts,
typical of micropayments, the contact is much less.
Probabilistic auditing can simply be grafted on top of
existing systems, and indeed has been proposed as extensions
for the NetCents and Agora solutions.
2) Probabilistic Redemption: Wheeler initially floated the
idea that weighted bets could efficiently amortize transaction
costs [75]. A simple illustration: for Alice to make a payment
of 37 cents currently requires a transfer of at least four coins.
Furthermore, lets assume that Alice only possesses dollar bills.
One solution is to toss a 100-sided die; if it yields a number
between 1 and 37, Alice pays a dollar to the merchant, and if
not, she gives him nothing. If this transaction is repeated often
enough, the average payment Alice makes to the merchant is
37/100 dollars, i.e. 37 cents.
Rivest’s lottery-based scheme [76], developed in 1997,
extends this notion to PayWord. In this case, the bank issues
Alice with a book of “lottery tickets” essentially consisting of
a PayWord chain with a specified lifetime. As with a PayWord
purchase, Alice uses successive values in the chain as payment
tokens and the merchant verifies each token accordingly before
sending over the corresponding items.
After the lifetime of the chain expires, the bank announces
that one individual lottery ticket in each book is a “winning”
ticket. If Alice has transferred this ticket to the merchant in
the course of her purchase, she is obligated to pay. In this
case, the merchant presents the winning ticket to the bank
which debits Alice’s account for the full value of her purchase
and credits the amount to the merchant’s account. However,
if Alice retains the ticket (i.e. she hasn’t spent it), she pays
nothing. In the long run, when thousands of such transactions
have happened, the probability is very high that the amount
Alice is charged will converge to the actual amount she owes
the merchant. Processing costs are minimized because the bank
only has to process winning tickets.
This scheme suffers drawbacks: the bank has to organize the
lotteries, circulate details of winning tickets, and the merchant
can only be paid after the lottery concludes. Rivest extends
the protocol to address these concerns and proposes a fair
mechanism allowing Alice and the merchant to decide among
themselves whether a ticket is a winning ticket or not [77].
Ostrovsky and Lipton propose a similar scheme to minimize
the bank’s involvement [78]. Here Alice and the merchant
both exchange roots of pre-computed hash chains prior to the
transaction, as well as cryptographic commitments to the seed
values from which the chains are generated. In each round,
both parties produce their tokens which are then XOR-ed to
yield the output for the round. Since both tokens are pseudo-
random values, the process is analogous to tossing a coin.
Alice pays the merchant depending on the result of the toss.
Rivest revisited the topic with Micali in 2001 [79] [80] to
present Peppercoin, a non-interactive version of the lottery
scheme. In this case, winning tickets are selected by a cryp-
tographic process: the merchant digitally signs a token and
checks if the signature result is less than a pre-determined
value. It is important that a deterministic digital signature
scheme be used (such as RSA), so that the merchant can
convince the bank that a ticket is a winning ticket. Given the
cryptographic nature of digital signatures, neither Alice nor
the merchant can game the system in their favour. Further-
more, to protect Alice from being charged too much at once,
Peppercoin brings in banks as intermediaries, or buffers, who
pay the merchant the inflated amount but charge her only the
aggregated value of the payments she has made.
Peppercoin launched as a commercial system in 2001,
starting services in 2003, but closed in 2007.
F. Peer-to-peer Systems
The emergence of large-scale peer-to-peer (P2P) networks
in the early 2000s necessitated research on payment solutions
for this new paradigm. There were two main motivations: first
P2P networks suffered from the free-rider problem, i.e. certain
peers would solely use network resources without contributing
any themselves. One solution is to deploy a metering or
micropayment solution to incentivize participation and ensures
fairness in the network [81] [82].
The second reason is commercial. Networks like Napster
and Kazaa suffered immense backlash and heavy litigation
from the recording industry for freely sharing pirated content,
leading researchers to examine possibilities for transitioning
these networks to legal marketplaces.
PPay [83], presented by Yang and Garcia-Molina in 2003,
is one of the earliest and most influential P2P micropayment
systems. PPay is a debit-based protocol that adapts several
innovations from past systems to a P2P environment.
In the PPay ecosystem, a broker issues coins to Alice
which are essentially certified vouchers of fixed denomination,
bearing identifying information such as a unique serial number
and Alice’s identity. To make a payment, Alice prepares a
reassignment message, consisting of identity of the merchant,
the coin’s information, and an assigned sequence number
which increments every time the coin changes hands. Alice
signs this message and sends it to the merchant who then
becomes the official ‘holder’ of the coin (as opposed to Alice
who is the ‘owner’ of the coin).
The merchant may then use the coin, in the role of a
customer, to make a purchase from another merchant. In this
event, he sends Alice a reassignment request, i.e. a digitally
signed message with details of his last transaction with Alice
and the identity of the new merchant. Alice prepares and
sends back to both a reassignment message with the identity
of the new merchant and incrementing the assigned sequence
number. Alice also logs the reassignment request, as evidence
that the first merchant relinquished the coin. The broker is
only approached when users want to cash out of the system.
PPay has considerable strengths: first, broker involvement is
considerably reduced as coin owners manage security of the
coin. All messages are digitally signed by all parties, thereby
enabling forensic analysis later on to identify any instances of
double-spending or fraud.
However, there are also some weaknesses: coin owners are
required to be online to facilitate transactions. A solution, the
authors suggest, is to enable coin holders to issue reassignment
messages themselves which are ‘appended’ to the coin, giving
rise to the notion of “layered” coins. Each layer is a new
reassignment message, which can be “peeled” back later on
to validate the provenance of the coin by verifying signatures
and sequence numbers. Another alternative is to allow brokers
and coin-owners to conduct probabilistic audits of transactions
and reassignment requests.
PPay has proved immensely popular and several schemes
have built on its basic features. A notable example is WhoPay
[84], by Wei et al. which provides revocable anonymity to
coin holders (not owners) by employing group signatures. The
identity of the current coin holder is concealed as one within a
group but, in exceptional circumstances, may be unmasked by
cooperation of the broker and a trusted authority. Coins are
not represented by serial numbers but by public keys, such
that the owner of the corresponding private key is the holder
of the coin. For each transaction, the merchant generates a new
public/private key pair, and the original owner signs the coin
along with the new public key, to designate the reassignment.
The authors also suggest a public log for all transactions which
peers can check in real-time to detect double-spending.
FairPeers [85] [86], by Catalano and Ruffo, adapts PPay for
selling copyright content. A Copyright Granter entity, issues
digital certificates testifying to the authorship of a file. A
merchant offers to sell the file. To purchase it, Alice will need
two different coins, one sent to the merchant and the other to
the original author of the file. Unfortunately, in this scenario
the requirement that authors always be online for payments
can be problematic. Some solutions are considered in [87].
Another influential system, Karma [88], addresses the free-
rider problem in a decentralized manner. Coins are replaced
with the concept of karma. A new node, say Alice, entering
a P2P network is associated with a set of peers (called the
bank-set) which act as a semi-trusted authority, tracking the
resources Alice consumes and contributes, and maintaining a
record replicated across all the peers. When Alice makes a
transaction with a merchant by transferring him an amount
of karma, all the peers in her bank-set send messages to
all the peers in the merchant’s bank-set, testifying to Alice’s
balance of karma, thereby validating the transaction. The
merchant’s bank-set uses a majority voting protocol to confirm
the transaction is in order, and the merchant then sends Alice
her purchased items. This system assumes that the majority of
peers in the network are honest.
A drawback of Karma is that bank-set peers need to be
online to validate transactions. This limitation is addressed
by Offline-Karma [89], where each reassignment adds a
new “layer” of provenance to a coin. Coins have a fixed
lifetime after which the layers are peeled back to check for
double-spending and fraud. This function is undertaken by a
distributed set of nodes, known as the reminters, who then
affix a multisignature to the coin, re-certifying it for use.
CPay [90] takes a different route to resolving the peer-
availability problem. Instead of relying on multiple peers to
authorize a transaction, the customer runs a function to select
one peer from a set of online peers who have been designated
Broker Assistants by the broker. The Broker Assistant then
verifies the transaction.
Other P2P schemes in this vein include Zuo and Li’s
Fair Exchange File Market [91], which describes how to
integrate a payment solution between customer and merchant
in a BitTorrent-type scenario where file pieces are distributed
among multiple peers and have to be retrieved. Attacks on
this system are described in [92] [93]. P2P-NetPay [94] adapts
the PayWord-based NetPay protocol described earlier for P2P
networks. A prototype implementation is described in [95].
The most popular and influential system in this cate-
gory though is undoubtedly Bitcoin. Developed by Satoshi
Nakamoto in 2008, Bitcoin has achieved mainstream success
and is currently the world’s leading cryptocurrency with a
market cap of around $11 billion [96]. Bitcoin brings together
and harmonizes several of the innovations we have discussed
thus far: the currency units, bitcoins, are essentially floating
vouchers. Users maintain a public/private key pair. A hash of
the public key is considered the user’s ‘Bitcoin address’. To
make a payment the user digitally signs a transaction message
using her private key and the balance of bitcoins is transferred
to the receiver’s Bitcoin address.
Bitcoin’s most important innovation is the blockchain, a
distributed public ledger which records all transactions on the
network and enables peers to detect double-spending. This
is literally a chain of blocks, each of which contains recent
transactions. A decentralized set of miners is responsible
for the creation of new blocks and they compete among
themselves to solve a computationally difficult puzzle. The
winner creates and appends the next block in the chain. This
leads to Bitcoin’s second innovation, a monetary reward that
incentivizes miners to maintain the Blockchain.
A detailed description of the Bitcoin payment system goes
beyond the scope of our paper (interested readers are directed
to [97]). We note in brief some key properties of the system.
Most importantly, the network is distributed and trustless,
i.e. no centralized broker or bank is required to authorize
transactions or check for fraud. Bitcoin users transact usi
pseudonyms which confers a degree of anonymity, but research
has evolved methods to attack it [98]. Bitcoin transactions gen-
erally include a transaction fee (typically in the order of cents
or lower) to incentivize miners to include the transaction in the
blockchain. An important distinction here is that transaction
fees are not a function of payment amount but rather depend
on the amount of data in the transaction.
Bitcoin is described as a general payments system but its
relatively low transaction fees qualifies it as a micropayments
system in its own right. Indeed several commercial micro-
payments systems (some of which are described in Sec. IV)
already use the Bitcoin network to process payments.
However, researchers have innovated mechanisms to further
drive down processing costs using Bitcoin. We consider some
of these next.
G. Enabling Micropayments on Bitcoin
The most straight-forward approach to limit transaction
fees is to amortize transaction costs by conducting off-chain
transactions and only settling their accounts on the Bitcoin
network. The easiest way to achieve this is by introducing
a broker like ChangeTip or Coinbase to maintain accounts
for customer and merchant on their own system. However,
this strategy is not recommended: Bitcoin exchanges have a
notoriously poor track record of protecting customers’ funds
[99]. We discuss this point in more detail in Sec. V-A.
Protocols have been proposed to enable off-chain transac-
tions without a trusted third party [100]. Referred to as mi-
cropayment channels, these solutions rely on the blockchain
to resolve payment disputes. We consider an example: two
users wishing to transact set up a channel by depositing
funds into a special transaction which is then stored on
the blockchain. Access to the funds is prohibited without
authorization of both parties. The users then make multiple
low-volume transactions to each other privately off-network
which effectively redistribute this deposit among themselves.
To terminate the channel and redeem their funds, either party
can broadcast the last transaction they exchange on the Bitcoin
network. As a safety mechanism, the initial transaction bears
an expiry time, after which, if no payments have been made,
the deposit is automatically refunded.
We briefly describe some basic micropayment channels:
A uni-directional channel permits micropayments to be
made strictly in one direction only, that is from one user
to another. Only the sender has to make the initial deposit
onto the blockchain. Each micropayment then increases the
receiver’s share of the deposit. The amount of the deposit sets
the upper limit on the funds the sender can transfer to the
receiver for the session.
Interestingly, timers can extend support for bi-directional
micropayments. The timer determines the minimum block
height at which the transaction is accepted into the blockchain
and setting the appropriate timer value ensures that one
transaction takes precedence over others. In this case, when the
sender makes a payment and the receiver wishes to make one
back, the sender can broadcast another transaction reducing
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the balance of his last transaction by the appropriate amount.
Decrementing the timer value ensures the second transaction
with the amended balance is included in the blockchain and
the first is not.
Poon and Dryja propose Lightning Channels [101] that
supports bi-directional payments with infinite lifetime. The
channel has an active transaction representing the current
balance of both users and a list of revoked transactions.
Sending a micropayment entails revoking the active transaction
and replacing it with a new one that represents the new balance
of both parties. If a user circulates a previously revoked
transaction on to the Bitcoin network, the other user has a
time-period to broadcast a penalty transaction and acquire
all the bitcoins in the transaction. Either party can close the
channel by broadcasting the latest active transaction or both
parties can co-operate to settle the final balance.
Other approaches are being developed independent of off-
network micropayments channels: for instance, MicroPay
[102] provides a version of probabilistic payments system that
is compatible with Bitcoin. Recent research proposals have
also attempted to extend ZeroCash, a new and more privacy-
conscious cryptocurrency, to support micropayment channels
and probabilistic payments in the offline setting [103].
H. Discussion
There is a clear evolutionary trend in the systems we
have thus far examined. Early systems like Millicent, Agora,
PayWord, and MicroMint, showcase a variety of broad innova-
tive approaches towards micropayments. There is considerable
cryptographic innovation with an emphasis on security and
efficiency. Later systems, such as P2P systems are more
application-oriented and tend to synthesize these different
approaches.
We also observe a visible shift in design priorities and lim-
itations as technology advances and infrastructure improves.
Early schemes like Millicent and PayWord went to great
lengths to minimize usage of digital signatures and transaction
latency whereas P2P schemes have no such restrictions.
IV. COMMERCIAL SOLUTIONS
We examine a selection of commercial micropayment sys-
tems that are currently in use, or have had significant impact.
We divide these systems into four categories: in pre-paid
systems customers deposit funds into their accounts which
they then progressively spend. Several systems facilitate pay-
ments in various ways, either by allowing an existing payment
method to be used in a new area, or enabling customers and
merchants to manage their payments and purchases better.
Other systems amortize transaction costs by aggregating mul-
tiple payments into smaller numbers of transactions. Many of
these systems support both small and large payments, and the
target markets and benefits they provide differ considerably.
A. Pre-paid Systems
These systems involve a user making an advance payment
to the payment provider via cash or credit/debit card. This
payment is converted into funds inside the system which can
be used to pay participating merchants.
Paysafecard [104], launched in 2000, is a system based
around pre-paid scratchcards. Customers buy scratchcards in
advance that have a value (BC5,BC10,BC25,BC50 or BC100) and
a 16 digit PIN. When the customer makes a payment she
enters the PIN to authorise the payment. If there is not enough
balance on the card for the whole payment she can enter
additional PINs and use up to 10 cards.
Merchants receive monthly payments from paysafecard that
combine all of the transactions made for that month, thereby
reducing processing costs. Transaction fees depend on the
location and business area of the merchant.
PayPal [105], established in 1998, is an account-based sys-
tem where users deposit and withdraw money via credit/debit
card. Transactions are made in real-world currencies and
merchants pay fees for every transaction that occurs.
PayPal has special merchant accounts for micropayments.
These accounts function like normal merchant accounts, but
have a different transaction fee structure, charging $0.05 plus
5% of the transaction . Normal merchant accounts charge
$0.30 plus 2.9% of the transaction, with the possibility for
merchants with large transaction volumes or non-profit status
to negotiate a fee as low as $0.30 plus 2.2% of the transaction.
PayPal also offers direct carrier billing for customers whose
mobile service providers are part of the PayPal carrier network.
The PayPal carrier network has a wide coverage worldwide
due to PayPal’s acquisition of direct carrier billing company
Zong and partnership with Deutsche Telekom.
Flattr [106], launched in 2010, is a system enabling users to
support content creators such as artists, musicians or writers.
The user sets a monthly budget which is pre-paid into the
system by bank transfer or credit/debit card each month. The
user also maintains a list of people they choose to support.
Each month the monthly budget is divided equally among the
people on the list.
As only one payment is taken each month, only one transac-
tion cost is accrued, regardless of the number of people on the
list. Similarly, content creators are given one monthly payment
combining all of the payments sent to them by users during
that month. This reduces the fixed portion of the transaction
fees to one fee per user and one fee per content creator, a
significant reduction when users are paying small amounts to
many content creators.
Flattr also reduces mental transaction costs, as users do not
have decide how much to pay each creator, instead simply
adding people to the list when they see something they like,
and removing people they no longer wish to support.
ChangeTip [107], founded in 2013, is designed to allow
users to make small one-off payments to people, businesses
and organizations they wish to support. Users deposit money
into their accounts via Bitcoin or credit/debit card. Transfers of
any amount from one user to another are free and withdrawals
are charged a small transaction fee, set at different levels for
dollars and bitcoins.
As with Flattr, ChangeTip amortizes processing costs as one
large transaction deposits money into the system and enables
multiple small payments to be made without further costs.
Click and Buy [108], founded in 1999, is an account-based
system where customers deposit money via credit card and
bank transfer. A 3.9% transaction fee is levied for credit card
deposits, with bank transfer deposits being free of charge.
Merchants are charged both a fixed fee per transaction and
a percentage of their total revenue. The amount charged is
based on the average transaction amount, with merchants who
generally receive smaller amounts per transaction having a
smaller fixed fee and a larger percentage than merchants who
generally receive larger amounts per transactions.
Merchants can opt to be paid by Click and Buy on a
schedule ranging from once a day to once every 30 days,
with merchants who opt for longer payment schedules being
rewarded by smaller transaction fees.
M-Pesa [109], founded in 2007 is a mobile phone-based
account-based system where users can deposit and withdraw
money through businesses acting as agents. Users can transfer
money both to other users and non-users.
M-Pesa’s largest market is Kenya, where direct transfers
to and from bank accounts are possible. The system is also
available in a number of other countries. Transaction fees are
based on transaction size, with a fixed charge being levied for
transfers within particular size categories. Different transaction
fees are charged for transfers to users and non-users.
League of Legends [110], released in 2009, is one of the
most popular online games and uses a free-to-play model.
Revenue is generated by the sale of in-game upgrades to play-
ers. These upgrades are bought with Riot Points, a currency
used only for this purpose. Riot Points can be purchased with
credit/debit cards, PayPal, paysafecard, bank transfer or using
pre-paid cards from a variety of retailers. Transaction fees are
kept low by selling Riot Points in relatively large blocks, so
that the lowest purchase price is between $2.00 and $10.00,
depending on the purchase method.
As with with most in-game currencies, Riot Points are not
convertible into other currencies, and players are generally
prevented from selling or transferring their points to others.
Blendle [111], founded in 2013, is a news aggregation site
that sells articles using a pay-per-article model. Customers
deposit funds into their Blendle account using a credit card,
and then buy access to articles or entire editions of periodicals.
Content providers are allowed to set a price (currently between
BC0.99 and BC1.99) for each article they provide, with Blendle
charging a fee of 30% of this price to the merchant.
Blendle allows customers a refund on any article they have
purchased, with the requirements that the customer requests
the refund within 24 hours and provides a reason for it. This
step is designed to prevent customers paying for articles that
were misleadingly advertised or badly written.
The Starbucks card [112] is an account-based system that
allows customers to buy beverages and food from Starbucks.
Customers begin by buying a physical card with a pre-loaded
value. This card has a unique card number and security code
that are stored in a central database along with the balance on
the card. The balance can be spent at Starbucks stores like a
traditional gift card. The card can even be registered online as
belonging to a particular user.
A registered card can have additional value added to it in-
store or online, and registered users can also download iPhone
and Android applications that allow the mobile device to be
used in place of the card. Users are also able to transfer value
to other registered cards, allowing the Starbucks card to be
used as a form of currency among users, and use of a registered
card is linked to a customer rewards program.
Bitwall [113], is a system designed to allow the purchase of
access to web content. The system is currently in beta stage
and the pricing model is still being determined. At present
users can buy access to one article for $0.01, 24 hour access
to an entire site for $0.03 or 3 hour access to the site by
advertising the site on Twitter. Payments are made via Bitcoin,
using the current Bitcoin to US dollar exchange rate.
Mondex, VisaCash, Proton and Octopus are systems
based around a smart-card that is pre-loaded with funds and
used to make in-person payments. Of the four, only Octopus
[114], launched in 1997, has achieved commercial success,
being used heavily for public transport, car parking charges,
fast-food and vending machine purchases in Hong Kong.
Octopus cards can be reloaded with funds using cash at a
range of participating retailers, and can also be linked with a
credit card using the “Automatic Add Value Service,” causing
funds to be added whenever the card reaches zero balance.
Merchants are charged a percentage of each transaction
for the use of Octopus (this percentage can vary between
merchants and the factors that decide the percentage charge
are not publicly available) but no fixed transaction cost.
B. Facilitating Merchants
These systems improve the ease with which merchants
can accept payments. They generally work as gateways or
aggregators, enabling merchants to collect payments from
multiple systems without having to hold accounts with each,
thereby reducing both expense and effort for the merchant.
Mollie [115], founded in 2004, is a payment gateway
allowing payments to be made by various means into one
account. It does not provide a micropayment system of its own,
but instead allows merchants to accept payments by credit
card, PayPal, Bitcoin, paysafecard and various bank transfer
systems. Fees depend on the payment method used, with most
methods including a fixed fee of BC0.25.
Previously, Mollie allowed customers to make payments
via SMS or by calling telephone numbers, with the payment
amount being added to their telephone bill. This payment
method is no longer offered.
C. Facilitating Customers
These systems use technology to improve the payment
experience for customers.
Android Pay [116], established in 2015 is an Android
device-based system that can store credit card, debit card and
other card details and enables secure payment via NFC or over
the Internet. Apple Pay [117], established in the US in 2014,
is a similar offering based around Apple technology.
Merchants require a payment processor for the underlying
card and are only charged for the card used; Android Pay
and Apple Pay do not add any additional fees. While these
systems change the user experience and the security properties
of the transaction, they does not change the fee structure of
the underlying payment method.
Paym [118] is a system allowing payments between indi-
viduals who are identified by their mobile telephone numbers.
Both parties in a transaction must have bank accounts with
participating UK banks, and both parties must have registered
their mobile phones with the Paym system. The payment
sender can then use the Paym mobile app to make a payment
to the recipient, by entering the amount and the recipient’s
mobile telephone number.
At present Paym payments bear no charge, but many banks
restrict use of the system with business accounts or levy
charges on transfers to and from these accounts.
D. Aggregation
These systems combine multiple payments together where
possible to minimize the transaction fees charged by payment
processors.
iTunes [119], founded in 1998, accepts standard credit and
debit card payments. Payments are often delayed by a short
time (such as one or two days) to increase the likelihood
that the customer will make further purchases. All of the
payments are then lumped together before clearing them to
reduce transaction fees.
eMusic [120], initially founded in 1995 and relaunched in
2004, uses a business model that can be thought of as a com-
bination of aggregation and pre-paid systems. Users choose a
monthly payment level, which then entitles them to download
a number of songs during that month. One transaction is made
by debit/credit card for the monthly payment, resulting in a
TABLE II
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paysafecard Online markets  G#  
PayPal Online markets  
Flattr Flattr users  
ChangeTip ChangeTip users  
Click and Buy Online markets  
M-Pesa All payments   
Points LoL upgrades   
Blendle Online articles  
Starbucks Card Starbucks products   
Bitwall Online articles  
Octopus In-person payments   
Mollie Online markets
Apple Pay Online markets
Android Pay Online markets
Paym Money transfers
iTunes iTunes store
eMusic eMusic store  
guarantee that only one transaction fee will be paid to the
payment processor each month.
This system forces users to commit to buying a certain
number of tracks each month, allowing more aggregation of
purchases than may occur with a more flexible system.
E. Summary
The commercial systems we have listed all appear to have
grown around a specific problem or application, rather than
being formulated to produce a general micropayment system.
The majority of the systems do not provide anonymity, with
paysafecard as the notable exception (with the possibility for
anonymity by a technically skilled user in the cases of Bitwall
and League of Legends Riot Points). Privacy is generally
handled by policy rather than technical safeguards. The system
properties are summarised in table II.
It is also notable that none of these systems rely on novel
cryptographic protocols for properties like non-repudiation of
transactions or to prevent double spending. Instead, all of the
systems are account-based, relying on a trusted third party
to authenticate transactions. Even paysafecard, which doesn’t
rely on a traditional notion of an account, requires a central
authority to distinguish between valid and invalid PINs.
V. OUTSTANDING CHALLENGES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
Here we outline key challenges facing design and deploy-
ment of micropayments systems. Payments systems today are
particularly vulnerable to security threats and we present rel-
evant insights from the Bitcoin experience. We then consider
ethical and legal issues that need to be resolved to integrate
micropayments successfully into the financial infrastructure.
This is followed by a discussion of cognitive costs and
mental models for micropayments. There is very little work
done in this domain, and we anticipate that research may
enable improved usability for micropayments systems and
successful business models. In conclusion we discuss potential
deployment strategies for upcoming micropayments systems.
A. Security Challenges
Security is a pronounced concern for online payments
systems in general. A 2013 report by CyberSource calculates
that for online shopping with card in the UK, i.e. the card-not-
present paradigm (CPN), the fraud rate dominates and is about
ten times higher than for physical credit card fraud [121]. A
concurrent study by FICO discovered that the US credit card
fraud rate is spiking, surging 17% over two years [122].
The trend is even more ominous in the Bitcoin community
[123]. A key reason why Bitcoin’s transaction fees are so
low is that the systems has no fraud protection or dispute
resolution mechanisms. Bitcoin exchanges, marketplaces, and
wallet services are routinely hacked, resulting in thefts and
losses of hundreds of thousands of customers’ bitcoins. Mt.
Gox is a most prominent example: the world’s largest Bitcoin
exchange lost over half a billion dollars worth of bitcoins in
an incident, impacting user confidence in the currency itself.
One study documents that of 40 Bitcoin exchanges established
recently, 18 shut down soon after [99].
In parallel, researchers from Dell indicate a near ten-fold
increase in malware designed to steal bitcoins from users’
computers, the rate of creation loosely tracking the increase in
Bitcoin’s own exchange rate [124]. Some of these even employ
keyloggers to crack password-protected wallets. 50% of these
malware successfully bypass most antiviruses.
Micropayments systems are particularly vulnerable because
system security is not an isolated feature. Instituting fraud
protection mechanisms in a system will almost certainly add
to payment processing costs and cut into the broker’s profit
margins. This increase can be justified for macropayments;
for instance, debit card transactions in the US average $39
per transaction and the interchange fee is about 24 cents per
transaction of which 1 cent goes to fraud protection [125]).
But for very low-value payments, this increase is significant.
A related concern is that adding a fraud protection feature to
a system will likely impact system usability and add further
cognitive burdens on the user. For example, a user may be
amenable to the extra “hassle” of two-factor authentication for
making a macropayment, but for very low-value transactions,
the amount might not justify the effort.
Any solution addressing security for micropayments sys-
tems will have to harmonize these concerns.
B. Legal and Ethical Concerns
Micropayment systems, like most real-world applications,
will require legislative protection as well. Some scenarios sim-
ply cannot be prevented with technology alone (for instance
the supply of defective goods in a conventional e-commerce
scenario) and others may be independent of technology (such
as assigning liability if a payment system suffers losses due to
faulty implementation or mismanagement). Legislators need to
decide how best to balance interests of users and merchants,
and merchants and brokers have to decide if there is a business
case to absorb more risk themselves in the interest of gaining
market share and consumer confidence.
New payment systems may also introduce the risk of losses
beyond what the system can absorb. Bitcoin exchanges have
shown that it is possible for a company to suffer losses far
in excess of its assets when things go wrong [126]. This
has troubling implications for consumer confidence and is an
important concern for both legislators and businesses.
Legislators also have a role in regulating payments systems
and preventing customer exploitation. Recent EU legislation
has capped interchange fees for using credit and debit cards
at 0.3 and 0.2 % respectively [127]. It has also required that
card processors provide information to consumers about costs
associated with each transaction and a breakdown of the fees.
Micropayments systems will require similar oversight.
There are privacy issues as well. Already, concerns have
been voiced about companies amassing and monetizing user
data [128]. A good example is Octopus (discussed in Sec. IV):
in 2010, the Hong Kong Privacy Commissioner for Personal
Data found Octopus Rewards Ltd. to have breached data
protection principles with regard to the sale of customer data
to business partners for direct marketing purposes [129].
As we observed in Sec. III-IV, very few micropayments
systems offer the user anonymity from both merchant and bro-
ker. If micropayments are used to purchase individual articles,
videos or audio recordings then users’ purchase histories can
leak sensitive information such as their political inclinations,
religious values and sexual preferences.
However, strict anonymity also poses a problem for gov-
ernments. While many governments might wish to protect the
privacy of their citizens, at the same time there will generally
be legislation against large anonymous payments, as part of
money laundering and anti-terrorism legislation.
Anonymity becomes even more of a concern in the digital-
only, ‘cashless’ vision of society emerging in countries like
Denmark, Sweden, and Finland [130]. As digital payments
become commonplace, banks and payment processors can
blacklist parties for political reasons. A real-world example
of a payment blockade occurred in 2010 when US companies
refused to process payments sent to Wikileaks [131].
Discovering ways to allow massively scalable micropay-
ments systems which protect customer privacy and free speech
while at the same time preventing tax evasion and terrorism
financing is both a legislative and technological challenge.
C. Micropayments and Psychology
As we noted in Sec. II, payments systems impose mental
transaction costs, i.e. the cognitive effort involved in deciding
whether an item is worth buying or not, regardless of price.
These costs arise due to various reasons: for instance, a
large variety of choices can pose a mental bottleneck. As an
example, it is simply less mental effort for a user to buy
a whole newspaper for a set amount than to compare the
TABLE III
CHANGETIP AMOUNTS
Label Amount Currency
Beer 3.50 USD
Buck 1.00 USD
Cent 0.01 USD
Cerveza 3.50 USD
Coffee 1.50 USD
Cookie 1.50 USD
Dime 010 USD
Dollar 1.00 USD
Donut 0.35 USD
Euro 1.00 EUR
Gold-star 0.50 USD
High-five 5.00 USD
Nickel 0.05 USD
Pie 3.14 USD
Pint 3.50 USD
Quarter 0.25 USD
Quid 1.00 GBP
anticipated merits and prices of individual articles. This may
explain the appeal of flat fees.
In an influential position paper on the topic, Szabo [7]
contends that as prices go down, these mental costs tend
to dominate over technological costs, they set the effective
lower bound on pricing of goods, and therefore, may play a
determining role in the adoption of micropayments systems.
Szabo makes some recommendations for systems devel-
opers. First, rather than focus on technological innovation
alone, it is imperative to recognize mental transaction costs.
Technology may then be applied to alleviate these costs.
One proposed approach is to employ metaphors to simplify
the mental effort involved in making choices. We present here
an example employed by ChangeTip (described in Sec. IV)
which presents users with payment options labelled as real-
world items of similar cost (shown in table III). For example,
a user can choose to reward a party by “buying them a coffee”,
press the requisite button, and the system will transfer the
corresponding amount of money. Users may also define their
own custom amounts on ChangeTip.
Branding and quality control is another approach. If a brand
consistently delivers good quality for money, users may be
more inclined to trust its product and exert less mental effort
in choosing to buy it. One way to implement this would be
the strategy taken by Blendle (described in Sec. IV), which is
to offer readers an easy refund option on purchased articles as
a way to reward quality content.
Unfortunately there has been very little research done
on mental models for micropayments systems to date. This
is a widely neglected area that could use input from the
fields of psychology, human-computer interaction (HCI), and
behavioral economics. Understanding the psychology behind
micropayments will not only improve system usability but also
assist in crafting appropriate business models and successful
deployment strategies.
D. Business Models and Deployment
There are important open research questions regarding pric-
ing for a micropayments ecosystem. For example, is there
perhaps a pricing threshold at which micropayments become
viable? While there is currently no definite answer to this
question, there may be some evidence for it. The Chicago
Sun-Times launched a Bitcoin-based micropayment donation
option for 24 hours in February 2014 and collected over 700
payments, ranging from a penny to over $ 1000 [132]. 63% of
these payments were for 25 cents, the apparent “sweet spot”.
The question of how to optimally monetize digital goods
and services is itself an open and active area of research.
Novel business models are emerging for digital content beyond
the traditional subscription and pay-as-you-go paradigms and
interesting results are being reported. We present a brief
overview on this topic in Appendix A. Readers interested in a
more detailed discussion on this topic are referred to surveys
[133] [134].
Regarding mass deployment of micropayments system,
there are certain desirable properties a system should have that
would great help with success. For instance, a micropayments
solution should be inter-operable across a wide range of
merchants and integrate with existing payment infrastructures.
Not only does this give consumers more opportunities to use
the solution, but it will also open up new sources of revenue
for merchants.
Standardization is an essential step in that direction, and
that has been recognized by the W3C who have renewed
their efforts in this direction with the recent launch of the
Web Payments Working Group (described in Appendix. B).
An alternative proposal is to interconnect different micropay-
ments systems using payments gateways, allowing conversion,
collaboration and interoperability [135].
The current marketplace also requires that any solution
should be supported on multiple platforms. This is for two
reasons: the customer should not be restricted to only being
able to make micropayments on a single platform only (this
was a marked drawback of certain first-generation schemes
like Millicent). Second, to cut down on roll-out costs and
the network effects problem, Odlyzko suggests that it is a
good strategy to piggyback micropayments onto an existing
and widely-used infrastructure [9]. Mobile phones are an
ideal candidate. Smartphone usage is high and phones now
support considerable more resources (computing, memory,
bandwidth). Currently there is also a tremendous opportunity
here for merchants: a Gartner study [136] predicts that by
2017, mobile payments will make up to 50% of e-commerce
revenue in the United States. Goldman Sachs predicts that
by 2018 mobile phone purchases will constitute 50% of e-
commerce globally [137].
This may help address the chicken-and-egg problem with
micropayments systems. Users are more likely to trust and
adopt new payment systems if they have a positive reputation
[138], but merchants are reluctant to adopt new payment
systems unless they are widely used. Piggybacking micropay-
ment solutions onto the mobile phone infrastructure (or social
media) may solve this problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have undertaken a detailed survey of
micropayments systems. We discuss their security properties
and briefly document their development. Next we classify
the multitude of research-based cryptographic and commercial
systems as per their salient features and describe in detail
the workings of representative solutions and highlight the
intuition behind them. This is followed by a discussion of
outstanding challenges for micropayment systems, important
gaps in research, and relevant recommendations.
Our intention in this paper has been not just to provide a
comprehensive technical resource, but also to highlight lessons
from the past and articulate promising new directions. For this
reason, we do not restrict our study to the cryptographic liter-
ature, but bring together and systematize critically important
insights from a variety of fields impacting micropayments.
We hope our work has a positive impact on the future
development of these systems.
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APPENDIX A
A PRIMER ON BUSINESS MODELS FOR WEB PUBLISHING
Advertising: The dominant model for Web publishing is
along the lines of television and print media, i.e. by incorpo-
rating advertisements or “selling eyeballs”. Advertisements
constitute the primary revenue stream for the Web’s most
popular sites, such as Google, YouTube, and Facebook. Ad-
vertisements are incorporated in the content, along sidebars or
before videos start, and the customer does not pay anything
from her own pocket. This open access is appealing to
customers. However, it is technically incorrect to conceive of
these services as ‘free’. Advertising costs are passed down to
the customer in the prices of the advertised goods.
This model has several positives: highly customized adver-
tisements can be delivered very easily to consumers. Consumer
behavior can also be easily tracked, providing a rich source
of information for merchants and businesses. Furthermore,
there are minimal mental transaction costs for the customer.
However, there are also a number of negatives. The tracking
of consumer behaviour often infringes on privacy, sometimes
in noticable ways when consumers are delivered targeted
advertisments that may leak information to onlookers about
their private behaviour. Video advertisments may waste the
consumer’s time, and use an unacceptable amount of band-
width for some mobile users. Increasing numbers of consumers
are using ad-blocking software, which is a serious threat to
businesses using this model.
Paywalls: The second prominent model for Web publishing
is via paywalls, where users are directly charged to access
digital content. Paywalls can take on several forms. The most
popu ar m del is via subscription. This model is used by well-
known brands such as Spotify, NetFlix, which charge members
monthly fees to access their media catalogue. Then there are
soft paywalls (also referred to as Freemium services), which
offer differentiated service. Users can access certain basic
content for free, but to access premium or customized content
or service requires a subscription or a payment. Free content
may be actual content or a preview or free trial. Premium
content may include complete articles or quicker access (as
in the case of stock quotes) or even customized content (such
as digital newspapers for the IPad). This is the route taken by
brands such as the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times,
and Amazon’s Prime service. Some firms which are primarily
rely on the advertisement-based model may offer an ad-free
service for subscribers. YouTube has launched such a paywall
for consumers in the US [139] at $9.99 a month, and intends
to extend this to the rest of the world at a later date. Google
Contribute is a similar offering. A third type of paywall is the
pay-as-you-go paywall in which a charge is levied for each
article read.
Paywalls have yielded mixed results thus far and they are
recognized as being a difficult strategy to implement. The paid-
subscription model has notably failed in several cases, such as
with the New York Times’ Times Select [140], Time [141],
and The Sun. It has proved successful in other instances, such
as when the New York Times retried it in 2011, and with
ESPN and The Spectator. The reasons for success and failure
are still being debated, but quality of content appears to be a
strong factor.
APPENDIX B
STANDARDIZATION
In the mid 1990s, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
[142] (the predominant international standards organization for
the Web, consisting of technology firms, merchants, research
laboratories and standards bodies, including support from the
European Commission and DARPA) launched a Micropay-
ment Markup Working Group (MPM-WG). This working
group developed a Micropayment Transfer Protocol (MPTP)
[143] to handle money transfers online in a secure manner,
and a language to embed micropayment initiating instructions
in web pages, Common Mark-up for Micropayment per-fee-
links [144]. None of these contributions became full standards,
but they are available in the public domain, and some of these
ideas were implemented in certain micropayment solutions,
such as the NewGenPay micropayments system. The Working
Group ceased activities in 2001.
The PayCircle consortium, founding members of which
included CSG Systems, Hewlett-Packard, Oracle, Siemens,
and Sun Microsystems, commenced work on developing
standards for mobile payments and micropayments in 2002
[145]. PayCircle developed open application interfaces (APIs)
to enable software developers to build universal payment-
enabled applications for mobile business which interoperate
with payment service providers such as telecom operators
and banks. A public draft was submitted for consideration
to the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA). PayCircle concluded
operations in 2005.
Secure Mobile Payment Service (SEMOPS) was an EU
funded project formed in 2002 by banks, technology com-
panies, and research institutions, including names such as
Motorolla, Deloitte and Millenium Bank. It aimed to de-
velop universal electronic payment solutions for peer-to-peer
payments, mobile and Internet payments, real-time payment
transfers between accounts, and micropayments. The project
lasted two years and their contributions are described in [146]
[147]. A follow-up project ran from 2007-08 with a focus
on launching mobile payment services in some European
countries.
In October, 2015, the W3C launched the Web Payments
Working Group [148], to develop standards which “will sup-
port a wide array of existing and future payment methods,
including debit, credit, mobile payment systems, escrow, and
Bitcoin and other distributed ledger technologies.” Micropay-
ments were one issue they discussed at TPAC 2016 [149].
